Counterintelligence:

Now more than ever

This briefing is UNCLASSIFIED
Overview

- NCIS Mission
- Counterintelligence Definition
- Specific Trends / Case Studies
- DoN and DoD Requirements for Reporting
- CI Video
NCIS Mission

- Prevent and solve crimes that threaten the war fighting capability of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps

- Three Priorities:
  - Prevent Terrorism
  - Protect Secrets
  - Reduce Crime

- NCIS is the executive agency for counterintelligence within the Department of the Navy
Counterintelligence

Intelligence function concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat posed by hostile intelligence agencies, organizations, or individuals engaged in terrorism, espionage, sabotage, and subversion.
Why Should We Be Concerned?

- Loss of:
  - Battlefield superiority
  - Strategic and tactical advantage
  - Technological edge
  - Defense countermeasures
  - Financial / economic investment
BE AWARE!

- DoN personnel & contractors are potential targets of foreign intelligence services and terrorist organizations. Why??

- **Access to:**
  - Classified & Sensitive information
  - Technology
  - Specific projects
  - Training
  - Worldwide Presence
The Insider (Spy) Threat

- Access to classified must be gained through technical means or through an insider.
- Any employee who has access to sensitive, classified, or proprietary information that if improperly disclosed, could cause damage to the organization’s security or interests.
- Almost all of the (known) damage done to national security has been the result of a person who had authorized access!
Espionage and the Navy

35 major espionage convictions since 1978

- Robert KIM
- Jerry WHITWORTH
- Arthur WALKER
- John WALKER
- Jonathan POLLARD
- James WILMOUTH
- Kurt LESSENTHIEN
Aldrich Hazen Ames was arrested by the FBI in Arlington, Virginia on espionage charges on February 24, 1994. At the time of his arrest, Ames was a 31-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who had been spying for the Russians since 1985. Arrested with him was his wife, Rosario Ames, who had aided and abetted his espionage activities.

Following guilty pleas by both Ames and his wife on April 28, 1994, Ames was sentenced to incarceration for life without the possibility of parole. Rosario Ames was sentenced on October 20, 1994 to 63 months in prison.
Hanssen first volunteered to furnish highly sensitive documents to KGB intelligence officers assigned to the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C. Hanssen received diamonds and cash worth more than $600,000 for the transfer of highly classified national security and counterintelligence information.

On over 20 separate occasions, Hanssen clandestinely left packages for the KGB, and its successor agency, the SVR, at dead drop sites in the Washington area. He also provided over two dozen computer diskettes containing additional disclosures of information. Overall, Hanssen gave the KGB/SVR more than 6,000 pages of valuable documentary material.

Hanssen was convicted of espionage and sentenced to a life in prison.
MIAMI, June 26, 2001 -- A retired Army intelligence chief described as the highest-ranking U.S. military officer ever charged with espionage was quickly convicted today of selling military secrets to the Soviet Union for 25 years during the Cold War. A federal jury in Tampa deliberated two hours before finding George Trofimoff, 74, a retired Army Reserve colonel, guilty of one count of conspiracy to commit espionage. On 27 September 2001, George Trofimoff, convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage, was sentenced to life in prison.
1985 - JONATHAN J. POLLARD, intelligence analyst with the Naval Investigative Service and his wife, ANNE HENDERSON-POLLARD, were apprehended on 21 November outside of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, DC as they vainly sought asylum with hope of fleeing the country. Both were charged under the espionage code for selling classified documents to an Israeli intelligence unit for $50,000. On 4 March 1987 Jonathan Pollard was sentenced to life imprisonment. Anne Henderson-Pollard received a five-year term.
Common Intelligence Collection Practices

- Requests for Information
- Focused targeting of air shows and conferences
- Exploiting facility tours and data exchanges
- Tasking foreign students
Indicators of Espionage

- Expansion of access to classified info
- Unauthorized removal/possession of classified info
- Extensive copying of classified/sensitive info
- Bringing recording media into unauthorized spaces
- Unexplained affluence
- Correspondence/unreported contact with foreign nationals
- Offering jobs or extra income to personnel with access to classified info
- Repeated involvement in security violations
- Joking or bragging about working for a FISS
- Visits to a foreign establishment
- Business dealings with foreign nationals or firms
- Elicitation attempts (Example)
Additional Requirements for Reporting
SECNAVINST 5510.30A and DoD 5240.6

- Report any contact information or circumstances that could pose a threat to the security of the U.S. personnel, DoD or other U.S. resources and classified national security information.
- Requests for unauthorized access to classified information or information systems.
- Contact with an individual, under circumstances that suggest the DoD person may be the target of attempted exploitation.
- Contact with a known or suspected foreign intelligence officer or contact with any foreign diplomatic establishment.
Additional Requirements for Reporting

- Contact with anyone receiving information of planned, attempted, actual or suspected terrorism, espionage, sabotage, subversion or other intelligence activities against the U.S.
- Actual or attempted unauthorized access into a U.S. automated information system and/or unauthorized transmission of classified information over information systems or telephones.
- Close and continuing associations with foreign nationals.
- SCI personnel shall notify SSO of any foreign travel.
Why Report?

- Protects critical technologies / assets / infrastructure
- Limits potential battlefield vulnerabilities
- Helps determine Foreign Intelligence activity
- Deflects unwarranted scrutiny and security suspicions
- Provides information for analysis and potential operations
Summary

- The Foreign Intelligence Service threat is continuous, long-term, subtle, and pervasive.
- The U.S. remains vulnerable and it is imperative that suspicious activity is reported in a timely and accurate manner.
- You are the *first line of defense* in preventing and reporting espionage!
NCIS Contact Information

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